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Maryland Ground Rents Not Realized Income
On Sale Of Leasehold
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Simmers' Estate'
Taxpayer, as part of the real estate development busi-
ness, bought land, built houses thereon, and created ground
rents which he retained upon sale of the houses and trans-
fer of the leasehold to the purchaser.2 On his annual re-
turns taxpayer reported as gross income the selling price of
the leasehold interests. The Commissioner asserted a de-
ficiency equal to the amount of the capitalized value of the
ground rent (less basis for the land) contending that the
retention of the ground rent or reversion was not a reten-
tion of an interest in the property but actually represented
part of the purchase price.' Taxpayer contended that he
had merely created a leasehold estate out of the original
fee simple, and that only the former had been granted, re-
taining in himself the reversion.
The Tax Court held that the ground rental arrange-
ments were not taxable because they were mere leases.4
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th
Circuit affirmed (2-1).1 For tax purposes, in this situation,
a Maryland ground rent constitutes a lease and not a
mortgage.
The majority rested its opinion on the historical concept
of ground rents as followed in Maryland. Judge Soper said
that, "The decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
and of Judge Chesnut make it perfectly clear that the rela-
tionship between the owner of the ground rent and the
owner of the leasehold is historically and actually that of
1231 F. 2d 909 (4th Cir., 1956).
2The buyer was required to make semi-annual payments to taxpayer
of a prearranged amount. Failure to make these payments gave taxpayer
a right of distraint which could be asserted against the entire property.
This seems to be the usual form for a Maryland Ground Rent lease. Kauf-
man, The Maryland Ground Rent - Mysterious But Beneficial, 5 Md. L.
Rev. 1, 14-16 (1940) ; see also Lewis, The Taxation of Maryland Ground
Rents, 3 Md. L. Rev. 314 (1939). The leases were stated as being for 99
years, renewable forever which, by operation of law, made them redeemable
within five years at the option of the lessee at a capitalized value of six per
cent. Md. Code (1951), Art. 21, §§111, 112, 116.
8 In essence, the Commissioner asserted that the buyer had given cash
and a first mortgage in the form of a ground rent in exchange for an
absolute interest in the property and that the grantor (taxpayer) held title
to the fee merely to secure payment of the mortgage.
'Estate of Ralph W. Simmers, 23 T. C. 869 (1955).
Supra, n. 1.
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lessor and lessee."6 Under this view, a taxpayer who re-
tains the ground rent interest realizes no taxable gain until
title to that interest is transferred either by voluntary sale
to a third person or by redemption.' In anticipation of
Judge Parker's mortgage analogy, Judge Soper emphasized
the fact that the purchaser of the leasehold can never be
required to pay the alleged mortgage debt nor can the
owner of the reversion ever demand redemption or threaten
to foreclose.
In his dissent, Chief Judge Parker attempted to analyze
the problem by relying on the practical economic effect of
the Maryland ground rent. He stated that the beneficial
interest in the property is in the hands of the owner of the
leasehold while taxpayer has but the bare legal title.
".... it cannot reasonably be said that the seller, as
the result of the sale to the purchaser, has not received
rights under the ground rent contract as well as the
cash and the notes secured by mortgage. He has com-
pletely parted with the fee simple title which he origi-
nally owned, receiving in return therefor, in addition
to the cash and notes secured by mortgage, rights un-
der a covenant requiring the payment of ground rents,
a covenant which runs with the land, and which, so far
as computing gain and profit on the transaction is con-
cerned, cannot be distinguished from a mortgage in-
debtedness secured by the land."'
"No one would contend that the latter [mortgage
notes] should not be considered as a part of the pur-
chase price received by the taxpayer, although he re-
ceives nothing on them at the time of the sale."9
Maryland ground rents have frequently been compared
with mortgages and in some instances have been called
nothing more than a mortgage.10 It was evidently the Com-
missioner's opinion that the mere possibility of redemp-
tion" at the instance of one party (owner of leasehold)
8 Ibid, 914.
Ibid, 915, where the court said "... there Is no realization of taxable
gain until one or the other of these events occurs."
'Ibid, dis. op. 915.
Ibid, 916.
1°Posner v. Bayless, 59 Md. 56, 60 (1882) ; ,Kaufman, supra, n. 2, 47
et seq.; but this conclusion seems to ignore the fact that even In a purchase
money mortgage the grantor does not become the mortgagee until the in-
stantaneous transfer of title becomes effectuated.
1 Five years from the date of the lease. Md. Code, supra, n. 2.
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makes the ground rent a mortgage. 2 In 1933, the Com-
missioner had issued a bulletin which allowed the annual
rental on a redeemable ground rent to be deductible as in-
terest on a mortgage. 3 It was restated as Treasury Regula-
tion, 111, Section 29.23(G-1), promulgated under the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1939.1' The Commissioner relied on
this regulation in the principal case to show the con-
sistent administrative policy of treating ground rents as
mortgages. 15
It should be noted that the above regulation deals with
ground rent payments made by the lessee and their de-
ductibility on his individual return as interest expenses.
From the lessee's point of view there is a great similarity
between a ground rent and a mortgage in that annual pay-
ments not in excess of the maximum legal rate of interest
are required in order to prevent default and in each case
there is a right of redemption held by the lessee to which
he can, and usually does, avail himself. 6 On the other
hand, while the holder of the reversion is entitled to annual
payments for the use of his property, he can never foreclose
or require the leasehold owner to redeem the fee. From
his point of view there is in existence an unlimited lease
12 Government Bulletin No. 9, Vol. XII, 1933, I. T. 2679, XII-9-6047, 12
C. B. 103 (1933), (1933 CCH, par. 6128).
I. T. 2679, XII-9-6047, 12 C. B. 103 (1933).
"Treasury Regulations 111, promulgated under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939:
"See. 29.23(b) - 1. Interest.
"Payments of Maryland or Pennsylvania ground rents are deductible
as interest if the ground rent is redeemable, but are treated as rent
if the ground rent is irredeemable and in such case are deductible only
to the extent they constitute a proper business expense."
"3 But see H. Oliver Thompson v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. 987, 988
(1929), where it was argued that certain ground rent payments made by
the City of Baltimore to taxpayer were in effect interest upon the obliga-
tions of a political subdivision of the State and hence exempt from taxation.
The Board of Tax Appeals disagreed, holding:
"The lease itself designates the amount to be paid as rent and not
interest....
"Moreover, leases such as we have here are regarded by the Courts
of Maryland as establishing the relation of landlord and tenant and the
obligation of the lessee Is spoken of as rent."
In other words in 1929 the Board of Tax Appeals by refusing to accept
ground rent payments as interest (so as to enable taxpayer to exclude it
from income) was not willing to treat a Maryland ground rent as a mort-
gage at least for purposes of the tax-exempt interest provisions.
"6 The majority of the court in 'a portion of the opinion deleted upon
rehearing, in referring to Treasury Regulation 111, supra, n. 14, stated:
"Doubtless this concession was made because most redeemable ground
rents are actually redeemed in the course of time, and it seemed
reasonable to treat the payments of rent prior to redemption like the
interest payments on an outstanding mortgage."
The deleted portion of the opinion appears in the Daily Record of April
16, 1956.
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option agreement under which the lessee has no obligation
to buy in the fee. Until the option is exercised it cannot be
said that a sale has been completed. 7
However, there are distinctions between a ground rent
and a lease plus option arrangement. For example, in the
latter situation the lessee has only a possessory interest in
the property, and by failing to make his rental payments
or by allowing the option to lapse he loses only his right to
occupancy. On the other hand, a ground rent lessee must
either redeem or continue his annual payments indefinitely,
for unless he does so he may be faced with the complete
divesture of a substantial proprietary interest: i.e., the
leasehold interest originally purchased. In a lease option
arrangement the property will eventually return to the
lessor if the lessee fails to exercise the option. Because of
this, the lessor will take note of fluctuations in real estate
values. However, Maryland ground rents are renewable
forever. Unless a forfeiture for non-payment of rent occurs,
the lessor will never again regain possession or the un-
limited use of the property. The fluctuations in the value
of a ground rent turn not on the basis of real estate trans-
actions in the area but rather on changes in the interest
rate. In an economic sense the holder of the reversion has
exchanged something for his right to the ground rent. Prior
to the transaction he held an unfettered interest in the land.
As a result of the transfer however, he holds only a right
to receive the ground rents.
Under Sections 111 (a) and 111(b) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939,18 the method of determining gain or loss
from the sale of property is set out. It is the tendency of
the courts to apply tax statutes uniformly throughout the
country. Judge Chesnut has so indicated in Jones v.
Magruder where he states: "And if the statute is sus-
ceptible of general uniform application, we must apply it
without deference to the particularity of the Maryland
view of the nature of the estate."'19 In applying the Mary-
land property law, it might appear that the majority of
the court abandoned the principle and departed from eco-
nomic uniformity. It is generally recognized that the Mary-
land ground rent is unique as compared to other forms of
17 Young, Tax Problems in Real Estate Transactions, 1949 U. of Ill. L.
Forum 473, 477.
826 U. S. C. A. i1(a), 111(b) (1955). Determination of amount of,
and recognition of, gain or loss.
1142 F. Supp. 193, 198 (D. C. Md., 1941). See also Burnet v. Harmel, 287
U. S. 103, 110 (1932); 10A MERTrNS, LAW or FEDerAL INCOME TAXATION
(1948 Rev. Vol.), Sec. 61.09.
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so called ground rents in that the fee simple title to the
property held under the ground rent will not pass until
such ground rent is sold or redeemed.2" With this in mind
it would follow that if a ground rent is found to be suffi-
ciently different from a mortgage there would be no viola-
tion of this principle of uniform application of the tax laws.
That such could be the case was indicated in Morris
Lipsitz v. Commissioner,21 where the Tax Court said:
"In the case of the ground rents created by peti-
tioners herein there was no evidence that any pur-
chaser of a building made any downpayment on the
land or in any way treated the transaction as one look-
ing toward the acquisition of the land in such circum-
stances that the ground rent arrangement might be
regarded as the equivalent of a purchase money mort-
gage. The ground rents here were nothing more than
what they appeared to be, notwithstanding the Mary-
land law gave the lessee the right to 'redeem' after 5
years. We think that the so-called creation of ground
rents in this case was no more than the execution of
leases, which are productive of income only to the ex-
tent that rent is received. It was not proper to capi-
talize the rents and thus in effect charge the owner
with realization of income in the year the leases were
executed, as though the land had then been disposed of
at a profit. '2
It is interesting to note that in the principal case the
purchaser of the leasehold was apparently treated as the
owner of the building while the holder of the reversion (the
ground rent) was considered the owner of the land. This
m 42 F. Supp. 193, 198 (1941), MAYER, GROUND RENTS IN MARYLAND
(1883). Of. Pennsylvania Co. etc. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 19
BTA 699, aff'd. 52 F. 2d 601 (3rd Cir., 1931), where a conveyance of realty
for cash of $500,000 plus a Pennsylvania ground rent of $800,000 payable
at the option of the grantee at any time within ten years was held properly
includible in grantor's gross income. Note that full payment was required
to be made within ten years. Note also that a man in the position of a
Maryland leaseholder has in Pennsylvania a fee interest. Kaufman, The
Maryland Ground Rent - Mysterious But Beneficial, 5 Md. L. Rev. 1, 26
(1940), n. 76; Lewis, The Taxation o1 Maryland Ground Rents, 3 Md. L.
Rev. 314, 335 (1939).
21 T. C. 917, 936 (1954). The court was determining taxable income
by the use of the increase in net worth method.
0 Ibid. The Tax Court in the principal case cited the Lipsitz case In its
opinion 23 T. C. 869, 877 (1955) - however it emphasized the fact that
the decision was reached on the basis of the particular facts presented. It
is submitted however that the creation of ground rents is a relatively uni-
form operation and leaves little room for distinction. For discussion of the
form of -a ground rent lease see Kaufman, supra, n. 20, 14.
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is a common misconception of the property interest in-
cluded in the Maryland ground rent, for the Maryland
ground rent affords to its holder a partial interest in both
the land and the building.23 It is a partial interest in the
entire property and is treated as the fee interest, yet both
the reversion and the leasehold are the subject of mortgage
and judgment liens.24 Under the lease they are insepar-
able.25 It is submitted, therefore, that the result in the prin-
cipal case may be considered altered without reversing the
decision of the Fourth Circuit simply by redetermining the
cost basis of the leasehold and the reversion. There are
two suggested methods of determining a cost basis in this
situation.
A. Ignore the property rights included in the Maryland
ground rent and distribute costs applicable to the land
itself to the ground rent while building costs will refer to
the leasehold interest. This was the method used in the
Simmers case.26
B. Affirm the property rights in Maryland ground
rents and allocate the total cost on the basis of the fair
market value of the component leasehold and reversion on
the date of the creation of these separate interests.17 Since
the leasehold came into being as the result of a prospective
sale, its fair market value should be easily determined as
the selling price of the leasehold. The same is true for the
reversion which can readily be sold for the capitalized
value of the ground rent.
Assume that a builder has purchased a lot for $200. In
addition a home was constructed for $9,800. The property
is purchased for $13,000 plus a $12028 annual ground rent.
The capitalized value of the ground rent is $2,000. The tax
effect under each of the above methods is as follows:
aKaufman, ibid, 66; THOMPSON, MARYLAND GROUND RENTS AS VIEWED
BY A TRUSTMAN (1947) 40 (thesis submitted to the Graduate School of
Banking conducted by the American Bankers Association at Rutgers Uni-
versity).
2'MAYER, op. cit. supra, n. 20, 69.
THOMPSON, zoo. cit., supra, n. 23.
-2.31 F. 2d 909 (4th Cir., 1956).
MERTENS, op. cit., supra, n. 19, §21.05, §21.23, Nathan Blum, 5 T. C. 702
(1945); C. D. Johnson Lumber Corporation, 12 T. C. 348 (1949); Oscar
Bowman, 14 T. C. M. 46 (1955). See also L. M. Graves, 11 T. C. M. 467,
472 (1952), where the court stated: ". . . where consideration is paid for
a mixed group of assets a cost basis is to be allocated to each asset based
upon its relative value to the whole at the time of acquisition."
28Payable $60 semi-annually.
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Method Method
A B 29
Cost Basis of Building ................ $ 9,800 $ 8,667
Cost Basis of Land ........................ 200 1,333
Total Cost of Basis of Property 10,000 10,000
Selling Price of Leasehold ......... 13,000 13,000
Less: Cost Basis ............................ 9,800 8,667
Reportable Income on Sale of
Leasehold .................................. 3,200 4,333
Selling Price of Reversion .......... 2,000 2,000
Less: Cost Basis ............................ 200 1,333
Reportable Income on Sale of
R eversion .................................. 1,800 667
The Commissioner wished to have reported as income
the entire profit ($5,000) on the date of the sale of the
leasehold. Reportable income is deferred until the rever-
sion is either sold or redeemed to the amount of $1,800
under Method A, but only $667 under Method B. Method B
would appear to be the more logical method since it gives
full effect to the special attributes of a Maryland ground
rent. Where the majority in the Simmers case has turned
the result as to the "realization" issue on these same pecu-
liarities of the Maryland ground rent, consistency would
seem to require that the Commissioner be allowed to use
Method B. By using Method B, the Commissioner would
Basis of computation under Method B:
Fair market value of leasehold ................ $13,000
Fair market value of reversion ................ 2,000
Fair market value of property in fee simple .... $15,000
Total cost of property ........................ $10,000
- Basis of leasehold: 13,000 x 10,000 = 8,667
15,000




be able to recoup most of the potential revenue loss that
the Simmers case entails.3 0
It is important to note that the Commissioner has issued
a nonacquiescence to the decision in the Simmers case. 1
However, certiorari was not authorized.2 Treasury Regu-
lation 111, Section 29.23(G-1), promulgated under the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 193983 is still in effect. The Fourth
Circuit taxpayer is in a strong position in relying on the
Simmers case; however, in view of the history of this prob-
lem and the Treasury non-acquiescence to the Tax Court
decision, the taxpayer is not assured that he will be free
from litigation on adopting the Simmers treatment.
RONALD M. SMULLIAN
Forbearance To Sue On An Invalid Claim As
Consideration For A Contract
Fiege v. Boehm1
Plaintiff accused defendant of being the father of her
illegitimate child. To induce plaintiff to forebear bringing
bastardy proceedings, defendant orally promised to pay
plaintiff's medical expenses, loss of wages from her job,
and a fixed sum for the support of the child. After paying
for a short time, defendant had blood tests made which
conclusively showed that he was not the father. Defendant,
therefore, refused to pay plaintiff any further sums. Plain-
tiff subsequently brought bastardy proceedings in the
Criminal Court of Baltimore City. Upon defendant's being
acquitted, plaintiff brought this action for damages in the
Superior Court of Baltimore City alleging breach of the
agreement. That court entered judgment for plaintiff. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that for-
bearance to press a claim that is in fact invalid may still be
consideration for a promise when the claim is made in good
31 Supra, n. 26. Note that in the principal case Simmers had died. There-
fore the basis of the ground rent to his estate was the fair market value
of the asset at the time Of death - §113(a)5 of the 1939 INT. REv. CODE,
26 U. S. C. A. §113 (1955), now §1014 of the 1954 INT. RaV. CODE. In that
event no income would be realized to the estate from the sale or redemption
of the ground rent at Its fair market value, and the appreciation in the
value of the land resulting from the developer's activities would escape
taxation entirely.
1955-2 Cun. Bull. 11.
1956 C. C. H. Vol. 5, 51, 143.
Supra, n. 14.
1210 Md. 352, 123 A. 2d 316 (1956).
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